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Abstract
  An exogenous inﬂ  ow of foreign exchange can lead to an appreciation of the 
currency of the receiving country, a deterioration of its competitiveness and a fall in net 
exports. Economic theory identiﬁ  es this as the “Dutch Disease” although it is more often 
observed in emerging economies. The origin of the real exchange rate appreciation can 
differ from country to country but the inﬂ  ow of remittances, the main and clearer gain for 
the emigration countries, has been accused for such an outcome. This paper tests the 
applicability of the “Dutch Disease” for two small transition economies under a free ﬂ  oat-
ing exchange rate regime, namely Albania and Moldova. In recent years, these countries 
have experienced impressive outﬂ  ows of emigrants and even more impressive inﬂ  ows of 
remittances. However, the econometric results, based on the ordinary least squares ﬁ  xed 
effects, show that the impact of the workers’ remittances on the real exchange rate varies 
among the countries examined. The results conﬁ  rm that the macroeconomic implications 
of these large capital inﬂ  ows have been actually different between the countries.
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INTRODUCTION
  Most Balkan countries are still struggling to complete their transition 
to market economies. During this process, their governments had to surpass 
huge economic and structural obstacles while other, new ones, were turning 
up. Initially, they all experienced a substantial decline in their output. Later, 
they experienced growth rates higher than those corresponding to advanced 
economies. Romanian Statistical Review nr. 1 / 2014 46
  Among the late reformers were Albania, Moldova, Bulgaria and 
Romania, though the last two actually managed not only to overcome their 
transition problems, but also to become members of the European Union. This 
fact shows that they carried out all the necessary reforms more decisively 
than the other transition Balkan countries. Besides that, the more extended 
the structural reforms are and the earlier the macroeconomic stabilization is 
achieved, the more rapid the growth is (Fischer and Sahay, 2000, p.15). 
  One common obstacle for the transition countries was the appreciation 
of the exchange rate, which made the currencies overvalued and the exports 
of the countries non-competitive. The origin of this problem may differ from 
country to country. This paper tries to explain the Dutch Disease part of the 
phenomenon. In Rutherford’s dictionary of Economics (1992, in Dobrynskaya 
and Turkisch, 2009, p. 13), the term determines the decline in traditional 
industries due to the rapid growth and prosperity of a new industry. Moreover, 
“Dutch Disease” is the name used to express the procyclicality of capital ﬂ  ows 
in a country (Frankel, 2009, p. 4). Generally, it is the reduction in the export 
performance of a country, on account of an appreciation of the exchange rate 
(Barder, 2006, p. 4). The “Dutch Disease” hypothesis refers to the crowding 
out of the rest of the export sector exactly due to the large capital inﬂ  ows 
caused by the booming one (Beja, 2010, p. 2). As far as the capital inﬂ  ows 
are concerned, they are the increases in net international indebtedness of the 
private and public sectors and such increases are usually identiﬁ  ed through 
wider current account deﬁ  cits and/or reserve accumulation (Calvo et al., 1994, 
p. 54). 
  This economic phenomenon affects the emerging economies as well 
as the advanced ones (Bandara, 1995, p. 312), especially when they are liable 
to shocks that trigger foreign exchange inﬂ  ows, such as the discovery of 
natural resources or the inﬂ  ow of emigrants’ remittances. The currencies of 
West Balkan countries for example have been found to be overvalued, while 
the ones of the East Balkans ones   undervalued (Holzner, 2006, p. 10).
  The paper will focus on the analysis of the “Dutch Disease” 
phenomenon, starting with the origin of the expression, continuing with the 
detailed presentation of its causes and consequences as they are discussed in 
the literature and the relationship between remittances and the real exchange 
rate. We shall conclude with the presentation of the real effective exchange rate 
values in two transition countries namely Albania and Moldova. These two 
countries have been recipients of large amounts of remittances since the early 
1990s. Furthermore, they both adopted ﬂ  oating exchange rates arrangements 
on their currencies during the transition process whereas Bulgaria (since the 
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to stronger ones. The aim is to reveal the “Dutch Disease” symptoms and 
the differences the phenomenon seems to present among the countries under 
examination and if possible suggest policies measures.
“DUTCH DISEASE”: A THEORETICAL SURVEY WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO REMITTANCES 
  “Dutch Disease” was the title of an article published in the Economist 
(1977, pp. 82-3) about the effect of the discovery of natural gas in the North 
Sea on the economy of the Netherlands. The gas exports led to large foreign 
exchange earnings. It is actually true, that the name initially referred to the 
situation in Netherlands, after the discovery of natural gas deposits back in the 
1960s. Due to this discovery, the wealth in the Netherlands increased, the Dutch 
currency, the guilder, appreciated and the country’s non-oil exports became 
less competitive. Since then, “Dutch Disease”, or else the “natural resource 
curse”, has been used to describe every appreciation of a currency, caused by 
a signiﬁ  cant capital or foreign exchange inﬂ  ow that makes the tradables sector 
of an economy less competitive (Tuano-Amador et al., 2007, p.5). 
  Remittances, apart from their positive effects for the receiving 
economies, are believed to have a few negative ones including the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. However, as mentioned above, other factors such as 
foreign aid, grants, foreign direct investment and all kind of capital inﬂ  ows 
is also likely to cause such problems. The reason for deepening into the 
remittances – “Dutch Disease” relationship in transition countries is based on 
the fact that the Dutch Disease related problems are considered to be much 
worse in the case of a transition economy (Kuralbayeva et al., 2001, p. 6). 
Furthermore, many Balkan and Eastern European transition economies have 
received sizeable capital inﬂ  ows in the form of remittances due to the large 
outﬂ  ows of emigrants they experienced since the early 1990s. .
  The main task for policy makers is to understand and control the way 
this phenomenon known as “Dutch Disease” takes place, so as to prevent the 
economy from undergoing it. There are two effects going on, that can both 
cause the real exchange rate to appreciate, making the country less competitive 
in the world market, the spending effect and the resource movement effect. 
  When the disposable income increases due to the capital inﬂ  ows, 
a spending effect occurs. The boost in disposable income leads to a rise in 
aggregate demand and expenditure in the economy, both for tradable and 
non-tradable goods. This pushes the price of non-tradable goods upwards and 
leads to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The prices of the tradable 
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market and most countries are price takers, this cannot happen. As a result, the 
real exchange rate (deﬁ  ned as the domestic relative price of tradable to non-
tradable goods) will appreciate, given that the price of the non-tradables will 
be the only one to rise (Bourdet and Falck, 2006, pp. 271-2).
 Capital  inﬂ  ows can also cause a resource movement effect. The 
boom raises the marginal products of the mobile factors employed in this 
sector and draws resources out of other sectors, giving rise to various 
adjustments in the rest of the economy, like the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (Corden and Neary, 1982, p. 827). The increase in the 
price of non-tradables makes their production more proﬁ  table and their 
growth raises factor demands, especially for the intensively used ones. 
It is true that the non-tradables sector uses labor more intensively. As 
a result, the wages in this sector relatively to other sectors increase and 
this motivates the labor force, which is a mobile production factor, to 
move from the tradables to non-tradables sector. This is called factor 
reallocation (Bayangos and Jansen, 2011, p. 3). 
  Firms in the tradable goods sector (e.g., manufacturing), will be forced 
to raise wages and following that, prices as well, and since this cannot happen 
in the world market, output will decline and proﬁ  ts will fall. The resource 
movement effect gives rise to direct de-industrialization, since employment 
in manufacturing falls. Both the resource movement and the spending effects 
cause indirect de-industrialization (Corden, 1984, p. 361). Brahmbhatt et al. 
(2010, p. 2) believe that the resource movement effect is less likely in low-
income economies, because most of the inputs used in the natural resource 
“enclave” are imported from abroad.
  Factor reallocation and de-industrialization are two symptoms of the 
“Dutch Disease” that harm the economy, by making it less competitive and 
disturbing it’s economic order. Real exchange rate appreciation will make the 
tradable goods that used to be exported less competitive and the export sector 
will be crowded out by the non- tradable goods one, the growth of which 
cannot by itself lead to the economic development of the country. 
  However, it should also be noted, that apart from the above mechanism 
demonstrated in the Salter-Swan-Conder-Dornbusch model, there is also 
another mechanism of exchange rate appreciation, discussed by Acosta et al. 
(2007, p. 2). This one refers to the substitution of work for leisure by the labor 
force, due to the increasing household aggregate wealth, which is caused by 
the capital inﬂ  ows. Since there is a smaller labor supply and wages start to 
increase the result is pushing production costs up and shrinking the tradable 
goods sector, since the rising cost cannot be shifted to the consumers through 
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  In a “Dutch Disease” situation it is worth mentioning that the real exchange 
rate appreciation can also occur due to productivity gains mostly common in the 
tradable goods sector of the developing countries. This effect is called the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (Holzner, 2006, p. 5). This means that when the gains are higher 
in the tradable than the non-tradable goods sector and the wages between the two 
sectors are equalized, the real exchange rate appreciates (Grafe and Wyplosz, 
1998, p. 1). In detail, there has been less technological growth in the booming, non-
tradable goods sector, than in the non-booming tradable goods sector of a country. 
As a result, ﬁ  rms do not invest in the non-booming tradable goods sector, since the 
comparative advantage of the country has shrunk and this sector has been affected. 
In this model, the real economy productivities have not changed, but the money 
price productivity in tradable goods is affected due to the currency appreciation. 
The effect describes the situation when wages are determined in one single national 
market and they tend to increase in both sectors (Holzner, 2006, p. 5). 
  Having seen how the “Dutch Disease” works, the remaining questions 
refer to how remittances get involved in the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. Remittances have turned out to be the booming sector of several transition 
economies, after the collapse of communism, but also of other developing 
countries around the world. Remittances are stable and countercyclical to the 
receiving economy. They play the stabilizing role the capital ﬂ  ows promise, but 
do not deliver (Frankel, 2009, p. 2). They provide an international risk sharing 
mechanism, they alleviate the costs of forgone monetary policy autonomy 
and consequently, they increase the viability of a ﬁ  xed exchange rate. They 
support the family income, protect emerging economies from the side-effects 
of globalization and they are also a form of insurance for developing countries 
against exogenous shocks. They generally have a systematic inﬂ  uence on 
how governments design their macroeconomic policies. Remittances are 
“unrequited”, meaning that they do not result in claims on assets, debt service 
obligations or other contractual obligations. Moreover, they can be taken away 
from a country ex post without causing house insecurity or income volatility, 
as foreign investment does (Singer, 2010, pp. 307-8). 
  Furthermore, the surpluses stimulated by the remittances in the 
balance of transfers can ﬁ  nance the deﬁ  cit in the trade balance (Holzner, 
2006, p. 3). The net asset position of a country is increased by the inﬂ  ows of 
remittances and as a result, the external equilibrium of an economy is certainly 
inﬂ  uenced (Lopez et al., 2007, p. 6). However, there is a strong cross-sectional 
correlation between the changes in the real exchange rate and the changes 
in the net foreign assets in both the industrial and the developing countries, 
which is commonly known as the transfer problem (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
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  Since “Dutch Disease” has been used as a common term to express 
the problems caused by a booming sector of the economy on the rest of 
it when this particular sector is responsible for a signiﬁ  cant growth in the 
country’s income (Younger, 1992, p. 1588), this could also be the case in 
the remittances receiving countries too. The booming export sector of the 
economy is a country’s labor force, which is exported as immigrant workers 
and as for the capital inﬂ  ows, which immigrants are responsible for, these 
are the remittances, which usually cause such problems in an economy, if not 
properly managed. 
  When it comes to the extent of the appreciation due to the capital 
inﬂ  ows and remittances, there are also many factors that play a key role in 
smoothing it. A fact, that is unambiguous, is that the extent of the appreciation 
varies from country to country. Actually, Bandara (1995, p. 328) supports that 
the impact of the proﬁ  ts of capital inﬂ  ows on the economic structure of a 
country, as presented by the traditional “Dutch Disease” model, cannot always 
be generalized for all the developing countries.  
  Acosta et al. (2009, p. 11), using panel data for 109 developing and 
transition countries examined with a generalized method of moments estimator, 
have supported the argument that the problem is less damaging for the economy, 
the more developed the ﬁ  nancial sector is. Mature and developed ﬁ  nancial 
sectors can more effectively channel remittances into investment opportunities. 
Bayangos and Jansen (2011, p.2) have also concluded that the liquidity on 
ﬁ  nancial markets can soften the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
When, for example, the ﬁ  nancial sector is well developed, then the investment 
rates are high and the remittances received will be channeled to investment.
  Furthermore, according to Fielding (2010, pp. 933-4) and the simple 
time series model he developed for 10 territories with a high level of openness 
to trade, a high level of measured government effectiveness and poorer states are 
less prone to a large appreciation. In contrast, states with a high level of measured 
political stability are more likely to experience a large appreciation. According to 
him, the most likely country to suffer from “Dutch Disease” is a middle-income 
economy that is relatively closed, with a stable but inefﬁ  cient government. 
Beja (2010, pp. 11-2), based in a dataset of twenty countries estimated with the 
seemingly unrelated regression procedure, conﬁ  rms this conclusion
  According to Barajas et al. (2010, pp. 42-45) and the panel cointegration 
techniques they used to test a large set of countries, there are other various 
factors affecting the “Dutch Disease” root, such as the degree of openness of 
a certain economy, the factor mobility between the different domestic sectors, 
the countercyclicality of the capital inﬂ  ows, the share of consumption in 
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All these characteristics have the potential to change the results of the impact 
of the international transfers on the real exchange rate. On the other hand, 
Mongardini and Rayner (2009, p. 15) focus on the way the capital ﬂ  ows have 
been used and not on the international transfers themselves, as the approach to 
mitigate the problem. 
  Generally, to determine the exact link between remittances and the 
exchange rate, domestic policies, international developments and the relative 
importance of remittances in total economic activity and in the external sector 
should all be taken into consideration. Moreover, the behavior of the exchange 
rate depends on the impact of emigration on domestic output and the spending 
pattern of those receiving them (Loser et al., 2006, p. 18). 
  Another important factor in this relationship is the possible increase in 
savings because of remittances, which would have a dampening effect on the 
“Dutch Disease” effect related to the exchange rate. As interest rates tend to 
decrease, capital ﬂ  ows will decelerate and this brings on a partial turnaround 
of the exchange rate. The impact of remittances on the exchange rate will slow 
down when the domestic interest rates decline, because the exchange rates 
tend to depreciate (Loser et al., 2006, p. 20). 
  The bidirectional relationship between remittances and the real 
exchange rate should also be referred (Vargas-Silva, 2009, p. 12). Faini (1994, 
p. 236) for example, claims that a real exchange rate depreciation exerts a 
negative impact on the real value of remittances. According to Égert (2009, 
p. 19), remittances may inﬂ  uence the exchange rate via net foreign effects, via 
demand effects on services (if not spent on consumption rather than investment) 
and via economic growth. An interesting argument also related to the “Dutch 
Disease” and remittances is that through labor migration, “Dutch Disease” can 
be transmitted to sending countries and the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate can result from the transfer of remittances (Wahba, 1998, p. 362). 
  In a research on the impact of capital ﬂ  ows on 57 countries, Naceur et 
al (2012) used a dynamic panel data approach estimated with the generalized 
method of moments, to report that while portfolio investments, foreign 
borrowing, aid and income appreciate the real exchange rate, remittances’ 
effects present diversiﬁ  cations across regions. However, when remittances 
lead to such an appreciation, it is the second strongest impact after the one 
caused by income. According to Cruz Zuniga (2011) and his analysis with the 
use of panel vector autoregression method, the impact of remittances on the 
real exchange rate appreciation applies only to countries with high remittances 
participation in economic activity.
  Table 1 shows the effect of remittances on macroeconomic variables 
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account. One can see the unambiguous positive effect of remittances on 
output expenditure, which could turn into a problem like the “Dutch Disease” 
hypothesis one.
Effect of remittances on macroeconomic performance
Table no. 1
Effecton variable
Macro 
Adjustment
output,
expenditure
Exchange rate (in trems 
of local currency per 
unit of  FE - 
depreciation is increase)
Interest 
Rate
Current Account, 
excluding remittances 
(increased deﬁ  cit, 
smaller surplus (-))
1. Remittances + - - -
2. Fiscal Policy 
(Tightening)
-+ - +
3.Monetary Policy 
(Tightening)
-- + -
4. Decline in income 
abroad
-+ + -
5. Increase in country 
risk
-+ + +
Net effect in crisis 
(1+2+3+4+5)
+/- +/- +/- +/-
Secular Change in 
remittances
+- - -
Source: Loser et al., 2006, p. 23
  In order to fully understand the impact of remittances on the exchange 
rate, one has to take into account the analysis provided by Kamas (1986, p. 
1178) who uses the Corden and Neary model (Corden and Neary, 1982), to 
explain the phenomenon. The fact that the booming sector increases its proﬁ  ts 
pulls resources out of the tradables and non-tradables sectors. Consequently 
output declines, while the increased spending, raises the relative price of non-
tradable goods, pulling resources out from both the booming and the other 
tradables sectors and reducing their output. There is an explicit decline in the 
other tradables sectors, while the net effect on output in the non-tradables and 
the booming sector is uncertain. While, in the ﬁ  nal equilibrium, the overall 
trade balance will be back to zero, net exports of the other tradables sectors 
will have fallen, following the fall in their production, while consumption will 
increase.
  Despite the fact that this effect has received less attention than the 
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export to the detriment of manufacturing or other non-booming sectors. This 
is particularly undesirable for the less developed countries attempting to 
diversify exports. The increased inﬂ  ows of remittances raise the supply of 
foreign exchange and lead the nominal exchange rate to appreciate. However, 
the increased liquidity on ﬁ   nancial markets, because of the increased 
remittances, may smoothen the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
Moreover, an increased spending by the households receiving the remittances 
both on tradable and on non-tradable goods will follow and since the supply 
of non-tradable goods is constrained in the short-run, this will lead to an 
increase in the price of non-tradables or an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate (Bayangos and Jansen, 2011, p. 2). 
  However, Bourdet and Falck (2006, p. 272) performing multivariate 
Engle and Granger co-integration tests suggest that the impact of remittances 
on domestic savings and investment, will enhance capital accumulation. This 
increases the production of both tradable and non-tradable goods, in the long-
run. Factor accumulation by remittances will affect the relative non-tradables 
to tradables prices. 
  Vos (1998, pp. 98-9) applied a computable general equilibrium 
model, the simulations of which suggested that remittances can generate 
“Dutch Disease” effects and that the foreign income injection in the form of 
remittances allows the economy to enlarge in the ﬁ  rst year, but in the next years 
there are some side-effects leading to a lower overall growth. That is, the extra 
demand due to remittances results in food price inﬂ  ation, which is transmitted 
with a lag to nominal wages and prices in the markup sectors, resulting in 
lower competitiveness. As a result, exports decrease while domestic demand 
declines with falling real incomes. Import demand also increases and part of 
the increase in foreign exchange earnings leaks abroad. 
  There is also the research of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004, p. 
1414) who found, using the instrumental variables method, that remittances 
appreciate the exchange rate, while foreign aid does not. Saadi-Sedik and Petri 
(2006, pp. 25-6) using the Johansen cointegration methodology, support that in 
Jordan, both grants and remittances appreciate the equilibrium real exchange 
rate and the effect of remittances is not as big as the grants’ one is (it is actually 
less than half that of grants), because they are spent mostly on tradables, with 
a smaller effect on relative prices between tradables and non-tradables. 
  The appreciative effect of remittances is usually weakened by the 
productivity enhancing depreciative effect of simultaneous foreign direct 
investment (Fayad, 2010, p. 4).  The “Dutch Disease” may not happen due 
to the role of large emigrant networks behind such remittances transfers in 
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even in the extreme case where remittances are exclusively channeled 
to investment and capital accumulation in the tradables sector, the “Dutch 
Disease” hypothesis can apply (Acosta et al., 2007, p. 19). 
REMITTANCES AND THE “DUTCH DISEASE”: 
EVIDENCE FROM ALBANIA AND MOLDOVA
  This paper actually tries to answer whether the remittances inﬂ  ows in 
small transition economies affect the real exchange rate and consequently inﬂ  uence 
the transition process. For this reason, the reference set will consist of countries 
where remittances have been found to play a major macroeconomic role. 
  There are cases supporting the argument that an increase in the 
inﬂ  ows of emigrants’ remittances causes an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and ﬁ  nally, a loss of competitiveness of the country’s exports. In fact, 
there are two papers focusing on both developing and transition countries. 
Acosta et al. (2009) and Lartey et al. (2008) use panel data from 109 developing 
and transition countries and estimate them with a generalized method of 
moments estimator. Both papers conclude that remittances are responsible 
for the appreciation of the real exchange rate, though the ﬁ  rst one focuses on 
the exchange rate regime that favors such a situation and the second on the 
ﬁ  nancial sector development level which may prevent it. Among the transition 
counties involved in these results one can ﬁ  nd Albania and Moldova. 
  Holzner (2006) investigating the real exchange rate distortion on 
seven Southeast European countries (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania and Serbia & Montenegro) concluded 
that the national currencies of most West Balkan countries were overvalued, 
whereas the East Balkan ones were undervalued. Especially in the case of 
Albania, he believes that remittances may be the most possible reason for the 
overvaluation of the country’s currency. 
  In fact, Albania has been widely referred to in the literature as a “Dutch 
Disease” victim. Germenji (2005) based on speciﬁ  c data from the Bank of 
Albania, indicates that the Albanian Lek experienced an appreciation, partly 
due to the large volume of remittances. Moreover, Nikas and Baklavas (2009) 
consider the Albanian “Dutch Disease”, due to the remittances inﬂ  ows, as a fact 
that could be prevented with the use of bank intermediation for the transfers. 
Barisitz (2004) interpreting ofﬁ  cial data of the exchange rate arrangements 
of the Southeast European countries under transition including Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and Turkey attributes them to a number of factors including 
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  Before proceeding with the detailed analysis of each country’s data, it is 
also necessary to refer to the variable to be used so as to derive conclusions on the 
loss of competitiveness of the countries under examination. The variable chosen 
is the real effective exchange rate. It has been widely used in the related literature 
to assess a country’s competitiveness in terms of prices and costs, against its main 
competitors in international goods and services markets. The effective exchange 
rate, or else the trade weighted index, is a multilateral exchange rate, which is a 
weighted average of a basket of exchange rates of foreign currencies, with the 
weight of each foreign country equal to its share in trade. It is usually viewed as 
an overall measure of the country’s external competitiveness despite the fact that 
some authors ﬁ  nd it inappropriate (Nenova, 2004, p.26, Horobet and Dumitrescu, 
2008, p. 114). The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange 
rate (which is weighted with the inverse of the asymptotic trade weights) deﬂ  ated 
by the home country price level. When the index increases, the purchasing power 
of the currency is higher, there is an appreciation of that currency and there is less 
of that currency to pay for imports.
  Besides the real effective exchange rates, the tables also include 
the average ofﬁ  cial exchange rate of the national currency of every country, 
against the US dollar, so as to show that the real sector distortions usually 
differ from the ﬁ  nancial sector. Emigrants’ remittances inﬂ  ows’ values during 
the transition period are also used so as to illustrate their possible connection 
with the loss of competitiveness. 
  Starting with the Albanian currency, one can see that the Lek has 
appreciated signiﬁ  cantly in the last ﬁ  fteen years. The current account deﬁ  cit 
of the country has been much smaller than the trade deﬁ  cit, exactly due to the 
presence of remittances (Germenji, 2005, p. 58). Remittances inﬂ  ows grew at 
very high rates between 1992 and 2008 and the country’s balance of payments 
was affected considerably by these inﬂ  ows. In 2004 alone, the Albanian Lek 
appreciated by 7.2% vis-à-vis the Euro and 15.7% vis-à-vis the USD (op. cit., 
p. 49). The appreciation of the Lek since the beginning of transition can be 
seen in table 2. The Albanian real effective exchange rate between 1995 and 
2012 has undergone a signiﬁ  cant appreciation, part of which can be certainly 
attributed to the inﬂ  ows of remittances and result to the operation of the “Dutch 
Disease” hypothesis. This gets more obvious in the years after 2000 and until 
the outbreak of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
  Both the nominal and the real exchange rate values show that the 
purchasing power of the Lek has increased, making the country’s exports less 
competitive. It was only during 1997 and the pyramid crisis1 that the nominal 
exchange rate of the Lek against the dollar reached a peak and the Albanian 
1. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the “pyramid crisis” see Korovilas, 1999.Romanian Statistical Review nr. 1 / 2014 56
currency depreciated.  However, at the same time due to rising inﬂ  ation, the 
real exchange rate of the country did not change as much as the nominal 
one (Schautzer, 2005, p.116). Moreover, remittances magnitudes show that 
they increased all through that period and a large part of them was spent on 
non-tradable or imported goods, rather than being directed to development 
activities (Vullnetari and King, 2011).
                                                 
      Remittances and exchange rates in Albania and Moldova
Table 2
  ALBANIA MOLDOVA
YEAR
R (CURRENT 
US$)
R 
%GDP
ER RER1 R (CURRENT 
US$)
R 
%GDP
ER RER
1990              
1991              
1992 150.000.000.0 21.4 75.0         
1993 274.800.000.0 27,0 102.1 123.1       
1994 264.700.000.0 15.5 94.6 139.3      109.8
1995 384.600.000.0 17.6 92.7 154.7 1,020,000.0 0.1 4.5 93.8
1996 499.600.000.0 18.3 104.5 128.1 87,169,998.2 5.1 4.6 92.8
1997 266.900.000.0 13.7 148.9 73.3 114,410,003.7 5.9 4.6 106.9
1998 452.270.000.0 18.5 150.6 61.4 124,309,997.6 7.6 5.4 103.8
1999 356.600.000.0 11.9 137.7 68.6 111,860,000.6 9.6 10.5 79.2
2000 530.800.000.0 16.2 143.7 70.2 178,600,006.1 13.9 12.4 91.5
2001 614.900.000.0 17.1 143.5 69.8 243,320,007.3 16.4 12.9 95.4
2002 643.430.000.0 16.5 140.2 66.5 323,739,990.2 19.5 13.6 90.2
2003 778.114.262.3 15.7 121.9 79.1 486,630,004.9 24.6 13.9 85.3
2004 1.028.347.573.0 15.5 102.8 96.3 705,239,990.2 27.1 12.3 97.7
2005 1.160.733.884.3 15.4 99.9 100 920,309,997.6 30.8 12.6 100.0
2006 1.175.553.649.8 14.9 98.1 101.2 1,181,719,971.0 34.7 13.1 102.8
2007 1.304.560.000.0 13.7 90.4 109.6 1,498,229,980.0 34,0 12.1 111.5
2008 1.225.543.134.2 11.5 83.9 122.8 1,897,300,049.0 31.3 10.4 132.8
2009 1.091.199.593.4 10.9 95.0 102.5 1,210,760,010.0 22.3 11.1 135.4
2010 924.317.333.1 9.7 103.9 91.1 1,369,910,034.0 23.6 12.4 127.2
2011 964.979.428.9  100.9     11.7 134.7
Sources:  a. World Development Indicators, 2012
 b.  Author’s  calculations
  R: workers’ remittances
 ER:  ofﬁ  cial exchange rate (LCU per US$. Period average)
  RER: real effective exchange rate index (2005=100)Revista Română de Statistică nr. 1 / 2014 57
  At this point, one should take into account that in the early 1990s all 
the transition countries experienced depreciations of their national currencies. 
This was also caused by the political and economic uncertainty. By the time 
the overall economic climate started to improve, the currency appreciation 
that followed was considered as a mere adjustment towards the equilibrium 
levels (Boeva, 2009, p. 7).
  The emergence of “Dutch Disease” looks very possible in the case 
of Moldova, another major remittances receiving country. Remittances have 
not been exclusively channeled to investment purposes. As a result, the real 
exchange rate of the country has also been appreciated and remittances have 
been accused of being responsible for this. At this stage, it is important to 
make clear that capital inﬂ  ows such as remittances can lead to the appreciation 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate in the short-run, by stimulating excess 
demand for non-tradable goods, which will lead to an increase in the prices 
of this sector. However, in the long-run, if the capital inﬂ  ows are used to 
increase the competitiveness of the national economy, the real exchange rate 
will undergo a sustainable appreciation. If, on the other hand, they continue to 
trigger only consumption, the result will be a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate (Herciu and Toma, 2006, p. 6). 
                 The data in table 2 is indicative of the development of remittances 
inﬂ  ows in Moldova along with the real effective exchange rate path. Both 
the ofﬁ   cial exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate depict an 
appreciation of the Moldavian currency especially after 2004. It is ambiguous 
whether Moldova has been a victim of the “Dutch Disease” and even more 
if remittances hold the responsibility for such an outcome. Previous research 
ﬁ  ndings however clearly indicate the considerable role remittances played 
in the consumption patterns of those receiving them in this country and the 
rise in imports they have caused. One could therefore presume that Moldova 
is a “Dutch Disease” example due to the remittance inﬂ  ows the country 
experienced.
THE MODEL
  As far as the determinants of the real exchange rate distortion are 
concerned, the existing literature identiﬁ  es a large number of variables that 
have been used to test an economy for “Dutch Disease”.  Holzner (2006, pp. 
20-7), for example, tested a variety of variables and concluded to a model 
that included the nominal exchange rate, the trade openness, the indicators for 
the International Financial Organisations’ disbursements, the aid, the gross 
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the government consumption. The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve were negatively related to the real 
exchange rate distortion, while the last three positively. 
  The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between 
remittances and the real effective exchange rate distortion in the transition 
countries under examination. To this end, all the other determinants of the 
real exchange rate variable need to be taken into account. The correlations 
between the real effective exchange rate and the variables that could have an 
impact on it were investigated (other capital ﬂ  ows, government expenditures, 
capital growth, technological progress, trade restrictions etc). We ended up 
with remittances, foreign direct investment and the ofﬁ  cial  development 
assistance inﬂ  ows, gross ﬁ  xed capital formation, the general government 
ﬁ  nal consumption expenditure, the international terms of trade and the GDP 
per capita of each country examined, although some of the variables were 
not statistically signiﬁ   cant for all the countries. In order to simplify the 
interpretation, the values of the variables are measured by their ratio to GDP, 
except for GDP per capita which is in constant 2000 US $. The model was 
estimated for the 1990-2010 period for which data is available.
 More  speciﬁ  cally, GDP per capita is used as a proxy for the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and it is expected to appreciate the real effective exchange 
rate. Fiscal expenditure, as well as capital formation, does not have a deﬁ  nite 
impact on the real effective exchange rate distortion. On the contrary, the 
improvement of the terms of trade is expected to appreciate the real effective 
exchange rate. As far as remittances, foreign direct investment and ofﬁ  cial aid 
are concerned, despite the fact that their increase would imply an appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate, the results are ambiguous and largely 
depend on a variety of factors. It is actually of great interest to present the 
apparent differences between the countries examined. 
  Due to the small number of observations, part of which has been the 
result of our own calculations, the test methods that can be applied are restricted. 
We chose to make the simplifying assumption that the remittances variable is 
an exogenous income ﬂ  ow, so that the equation of the determination of the 
real effective exchange rate will be estimated by the use of the ﬁ  xed effects 
Ordinary Least Squares method. It would be quite interesting to test these 
countries with more accurate methods which would take into consideration 
possible problems such as endogeneity or limited data statistics as well, 
but at this point we choose to focus on the primary differences these two 
countries present under the same simplifying assumptions, so as to have a ﬁ  rst 
impression on the impact of such a drawback of the remittances inﬂ  ows.Revista Română de Statistică nr. 1 / 2014 59
 The determining factors of real effective exchange rate (REER)*
Table no. 3
Coefﬁ  cients (p-values in brackets and 
statistics
ALBANIA
(1992-2009)
MOLDOVA
(1995-2010)
Constant term 3.7901(0.000) 44.5023(0.088)
R (remittances) 0.036770(0.018) -1.7235(0.000)
FDI (foreign direct investment -0.041252(0.228) 1.7673(0.008)
ODA (ofﬁ  cial development aid)  -0.028110(0.001) -2.7249(0.015)
GFCF (gross ﬁ  xed capital formation) -0.39420(0.0330) N.A
GFC (government ﬁ  nal consumption 
expenditure)
0.11725(0.001) N.A
GFC(-1) N.A N.A
GDPPCC (GDP per capita constant 
2000 US$)
N.A 0.077506(0.309)
GDPPCC(-1) 0.1244E-3(0.562) N.A
TOT(terms of  trade) 0.048845(0.001) 0.43637(0.554)
DUM (when ODA statistics is not 
available)
N.A N.A
DUMMY -0.46745(0.001) N.A
T (time trend) N.A 4.7087(0.004)
R2 0.85009 0.90448
F-stat 13.0502 24.6738
* For Albania it is the log of the real effective exchange rate
DUMMY: 1 for the years 1996-1998 and 2008 and 0 for the other years as for Albania
An increase of the independent variables shows appreciation of the REER while a decrease 
refers to depreciation.
  Each country was examined separately and the results are 
presented in table 3. The equations were assessed for basic diagnostic tests 
and they were all free of statistical problems. The signs and magnitudes of 
individual coefﬁ  cients in each equation, such as t statistics, the adjusted 
R2 , Durbin Watson and F statistics are all examined. In general, all the 
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  To begin with, there are obvious differences among these countries 
for which the different domestic policies are probably responsible. In Albania, 
as it was expected, remittances appreciate the real effective exchange rate, 
since the remittances variable is positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant. It is 
noteworthy that the foreign direct investment and the ofﬁ  cial development 
assistance variables work in the opposite direction. They are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant but they seem to depreciate the real effective exchange rate. The 
terms of trade present a positive effect as well as government consumption 
expenditure, while gross ﬁ  xed capital formation shows a negative impact. The 
variable of productivity is statistically insigniﬁ  cant, while the dummy variable 
is attributed to the pyramid and the recent ﬁ  nancial crises. It is unambiguous 
that Albania has been a “Dutch Disease” victim. 
  On the other hand, in Moldova remittances inﬂ  ows seem to depreciate 
or not affect at all the real effective exchange rate. It is interesting to examine 
the underlying reason for this outcome. First of all, in Moldova an increase in 
remittances, as well as in ofﬁ  cial development assistance, seems to depreciate 
the real effective exchange rate. However, in Moldova foreign direct investment 
seems to appreciate it. The effect of the terms of trade is the expected one and 
there is also a time trend probably representing the progress in the transition 
process.
  It is obvious that while in Albania remittances affect the real effective 
exchange rate by appreciating it, there is no such case for Moldova despite 
the signs. Moldova and Albania have already been tested in a previous paper 
for their efﬁ  ciency in channeling remittances towards productive investments 
and these results come to conﬁ   rm the fact that remittances entering the 
Moldavian economy are spent more effectively towards productive activities 
than in Albania. Moldova has found a way to protect itself from the negative 
macroeconomic consequences of remittances, despite the fact that it receives 
as large amounts of inﬂ  ows as Albania does.
  The macroeconomic implications of remittances for Albania, 
Bulgaria Moldova and Romania have also been investigated by Blouchoutzi 
and Nikas (2010 and 2013). According to their ﬁ  ndings, remittances had 
a considerable impact on the spending patterns of these countries, but 
they also displayed a growth potential through ﬁ  nancing investment. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that remittances have also ﬁ  nanced a large 
part of the imports of the receiving countries, a fact veriﬁ  ed by the 
econometric ﬁ  ndings. However, the extent to which they have debilitated 
the economy, for example due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
they may cause, has not been yet clariﬁ  ed. The possibility of the “Dutch 
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the transition period and the remittances inﬂ  ows has been discussed a lot 
and in some of these cases, it is considered to be a major problem for their 
economies.
  Bulgaria and Romania were originally supposed to be included in 
the analysis and the investigation so as to get a deeper view of the effect of 
remittances on the real exchange rate, regardless of the exchange rate regime. 
However, our results conﬁ  rmed the fact that the exchange rate regime factor 
plays a crucial role in the determination of the macroeconomic consequences 
of the remittances inﬂ  ows and more complex econometric methods should 
be applied to have a thorough result. As far as the ﬁ  xed effects ordinary least 
squares method results are concerned, Bulgaria, having adopted since 1997 a 
currency board, does not have a signiﬁ  cant remittances’ coefﬁ  cient in the real 
exchange rate regression. Moreover, the coefﬁ  cient is negative which means 
that the remittances inﬂ  ows would depreciate the real exchange rate. 
  Since Romania did not follow a peg similar to the Bulgarian one at 
least not until their entrance to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
2007, we considered it necessary to run the regression of the real effective 
exchange rate for two periods, the whole transition period 1990-2010 and the 
period until 2006, during which there was a ﬂ  oating exchange rate regime 
in the country. The results are obviously different and make the remittances 
behavior even more important under the exchange rate regime factor. Romania, 
as well as Bulgaria, affected by the ERM portrays an insigniﬁ  cant remittances/ 
exchange rate relationship for the period 1994-2010. Moreover, the sign of 
this variable is negative as in the Bulgarian case. However, before the ERM 
membership and while Romania was under a free ﬂ  oating exchange rate 
regime, the regression results show that remittances caused an appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate of the Romanian currency. 
  Granger causality is a technique for determining whether a time series 
is useful in explaining another. Using lags up to four years, we run Granger 
causality tests to determine whether the null hypothesis holds: the coefﬁ  cients 
on the lagged indicators are statistically signiﬁ  cant in explaining the behaviour 
of other indicators at a 5% and a 10% level of signiﬁ  cance.
  Dealing with the Albanian data, the Granger causation runs from 
remittances to the real effective exchange rate with three lags. This means 
that at least three years pass since the entrance of the remittances inﬂ  ows 
in the Albanian economy until the amount of savings needed to spend for 
certain consumption goods is ﬁ  nally gathered and the pressure of the spending 
effect on real exchange rate becomes clear. Regarding Moldova, the Granger 
causality tests indicate that remittances cause the real effective exchange rate 
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signiﬁ  cance level. Regarding the two new E.U. members there is certainly no 
causality from the remittances side to the real effective exchange rate either in 
the Bulgarian, or in the Romanian case, in spite of the fact that in the second 
regression with the Romanian data (1994-2006) remittances are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant in the determination of the real effective exchange rate.
CONCLUSION
  The “Dutch Disease” is an economic phenomenon related to the real 
exchange appreciation and the loss of competitiveness of a country receiving 
large capital inﬂ  ows or discovering a signiﬁ  cant amount of natural resources. 
Since many transition countries have been receivers of remittances, this 
paper presented speciﬁ  cally the remittances – “Dutch Disease” hypothesis 
relationship in the countries under transition. The ﬁ  ndings of the econometric 
investigation indicate that Albania has already faced the “Dutch Disease” 
problem while Moldova experienced a depreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate due to remittances. The case of Romania prior to the accession 
to the E.U. supports the argument that the inﬂ  ow of remittances may lead to a 
currency appreciation especially under a ﬂ  oating exchange rate regime.
  A constant persistence of the appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
without proper handling and without being accompanied by a rise in productivity 
and in the quality of the products offered on the external markets, will crowd 
out the traditional export sector, reduce  manufacturing output and even lead to 
speculative attacks. The paper has not focused on the growth – “Dutch Disease” 
relationship, but it is almost certain that the economy will face difﬁ  culties towards 
its recovery. A combination of ﬁ  scal and other policies would be very helpful in the 
policymakers’ hands, so as to treat the situation in the economy’s best interest.
  It is deﬁ  nitely the kind of shock that determines the appropriate policies. 
Kronemberg (2004), investigating the application of the “Dutch Disease” 
hypothesis on the European transition economies, (focusing however on 
natural resources rather than inﬂ  ows such as remittances) ﬁ  nds that corruption 
and neglect of investment in human capital (education) have brought “Dutch 
Disease” to these countries. However, asking the rhetoric question “…should 
oilﬁ  elds be set on ﬁ  re and the gold mines demolished?”,  he answers “…of 
course. No”.  As Magud and Sosa (2010, p. 27) have so typically claimed 
“When thinking about “what to do” about the Dutch Disease”, policymakers 
should beware—in responding to the effects of the disease—of killing the 
goose that laid the golden egg.”  Revista Română de Statistică nr. 1 / 2014 63
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